Do We Have Our Lakshya Correct on Lakshadweep?

The Indian subcontinent is located in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and its maritime security perimeter extends from Aden in the west to the South China Sea and the Western Pacific in the east. In the IOR, India is endowed with the Lakshadweep Islands in the west and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (A&N) in the east. These islands are the strategic squares held by India in the oceanic chess game and might play a pivotal role in India’s economy and overall development in the region. The geographical location of these islands provides a strategic advantage to India.

Lakshadweep is the northernmost islands among the Lakshadweep-Maldives-Chagos group. These islands are actually the tops of a vast undersea mountain (Chagos-Laccadive) Range in the Indian Ocean. Lakshadweep is an archipelago of 12 atolls, three reefs, and five submerged banks, with a total of about 39 islands and islets. These islands lie 200 to 440 km off the southwest coast of India and are divided into three groups. The North and South groups are separated by the 11 Degree North Parallel. The North group consists of a few islands like the Amindivi Islands, and the Southern group is known as Laccadive/Cannonore Islands.

The third group, Minicoy Islands, is located at the southern end of the Nine Degree Channel. The land area of Lakshadweep Island is 32 sq. km and has a population of 64,473 as per the Census 2011. Lakshadweep is an archipelago of 36 islands that are located some 400 km to the west of Kerala. Of the 36 islands, only 10 are inhabited. The islands have a total land area of just 32 sq km but confer a 400,000-sq km Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

The delicate balance between the environment and development in Lakshadweep Islands is greatly hinged on the complex, fragile ecosystems, with the livelihoods of the islanders being dependent on coconut, fish, and the coral reefs which are the lifelines of the islands. The present widely disparate and incoherent approaches to coral reef research in the country need to be coordinated and brought under an umbrella of an exclusive Institute for Coral Reef Research and Management, with the ultimate goal to ensure the preservation of the delicate ecology and the dependent livelihoods of people in the island territories of the country.

Even though the land area is very small, these islands are strategically very important to India for the following reasons:

The spread of these islands has bestowed upon India 20,000 sq. km of territorial waters and approximately 400,000 sq. km of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The lagoons and EEZ around Lakshadweep Islands have significant fishery and mineral resources, which are of immense economic importance.
The Nine Degree Channel, located near Lakshadweep Islands, is the most direct route for ships sailing from the Persian Gulf bound for East Asia. Proximity to the Indian western coast as well as to other island nations such as Sri Lanka and Maldives, nearness to busy shipping lanes, and wide geographical spread make these islands extremely important for ensuring the security of sea lanes of communication and also for maritime security of India.

Lakshadweep, ensconced on the southwestern tip of India, is up in arms against the Administrator as the inhabitants are afraid that the said reforms would turn out to be a recipe for a natural disaster. The government is trying to mitigate a brooding security threat that is slowly but surely germinating in the soil of Lakshadweep. The growing presence of China in the Indian Ocean and the age-old challenge posed by pirates in the Indian Ocean could make Lakshadweep a hotbed of criminals and anti-national activities. INS Suvarna intercepted a Sri Lankan boat west of Lakshadweep with heroin worth Rs 3,000 crore onboard. 96% of its population is Muslim and has a linguistic, cultural, and religious affiliation with the people of Kerala.

Hence, it is most vulnerable to the discontent that originated there. Radical groups such as the Popular Front of India have already infiltrated Lakshadweep. The geographical proximity of Lakshadweep to the Maldives and Sri Lanka increases the likelihood of the impact of political turmoil in these nations. Three years ago, a news portal published a report pointing out that a Chinese business delegation attempted to spy on Indian naval bases, specifically INS Kadamba in Karnataka and APJ Kalam Island on the Odisha coast, also known as Wheeler Island.

The best possible solution is to focus on developing Lakshadweep as a large military establishment with various defence facilities to counter any type of security threat to the country and also to avoid disturbance of the local lifestyle and environmental damage. India should prevent its enemies from fishing in troubled waters. If Lakshadweep becomes a touchpoint between mainland India and Agalega Island, India can effectively outsmart China in the Indian Ocean region.

The benefit of such an exclusive facility is that it provides all the necessary assistance to the settlers, besides effectively tackling the security challenges in the region. Research and Development facilities along with active defence capabilities may provide solutions to the problems of civilians also.

Introduction

The Indian defence infrastructure in Lakshadweep has been enhanced over the years. In 2010, then Defence Minister A.K. Antony commissioned coast guard stations in Kavaratti and Minicoy, thus boosting the presence of the Indian Coast Guard. In 2012, the second Manmohan Singh government commissioned the first naval base in the islands—INS Dweeprakshak, in the capital Kavaratti. In the same year, a coast guard station in Androth was commissioned. In 2016, a naval detachment was commissioned on Androth Island. Besides surveillance, these detachments work as observance and reporting organizations. And, there are plans for a fully operational navy base in Lakshadweep.

A bigger facility on Minicoy is also under consideration because of its proximity to the Maldives (71 nautical miles).

The strategy for coastal and offshore security has been articulated in the document “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy” of the Indian Navy. The strategy envisages ‘to reduce, counter, and eliminate the threat of armed attack by sub-conventional groups, and also the influx of arms and infiltration by armed attackers from the sea, against coastal and offshore assets’.

The chapter “Strategy for Conflict” covers the actions for coastal and offshore defense. Essentially the operations will be carried out by the Indian Navy in synergy with the Indian Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and other security agencies. India has put in place a powerful template for marine domain awareness, intelligence, and protection of the coastal and offshore areas, in the aftermath of the terrorist attack of 26 November 2008.

Some of the measures include setting up Multi-Agency Centres (MAC) for intelligence inputs and reports; registration of fishing vessels by states; placing in orbit the Indian Regional Navigation Seven Satellite System and satellite GSAT 7; setting up a coast-wide radar chain; raising a Marine Police force, Marine Commandos Rapid Reaction Force, and a Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB); setting up layered patrolling; putting in place The National Command Control Communication and Intelligence network (NC3IN) etc.

Thus, the layered defence of the Indian coast and its offshore areas consists of the Indian Navy, the coast guard, the marine commando & Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB), and the marine police. All these are info-linked for maximum advance knowledge and in a way form a networked coalition. In addition, the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) maintains a District Headquarters (CGHQ-12) in Kavaratti, the capital of the UTL.

However, there apparently is a gap as far as setting up the coastal and offshore area defences per se is concerned. The Navy also recognizes the need to elevate the region to a strategic outpost and a forward operating base, and infrastructure development is guided by the dynamics of the maritime template in and around the UTL.

A fourth NAVDET is likely to come up on Bitra Island. Of the 36 islands of the UTL, only 11 are inhabited. However, the securitization of the uninhabited islands, too, is becoming a priority due to the emanating asymmetric threats from within the maritime space. It lacks the delay, denial, disruption, and demoralizing (D4) capability, which is essential in today’s environment.

This capability should be acquired by leveraging the perceived threats presented by submarines, mines, small craft, and cruise missiles. The Indian Navy currently has strong regional interfaces with counter-piracy structures and measures being undertaken by other organizational structures, such as the European Union’s Op ATLANTA and the Combined Maritime Forces organized by the USA. The EU’s coordination structure for the dissemination of information related to national and multinational anti-piracy efforts is the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE).

The Indian Navy is a member of SHADE, as are other individual navies (such as those of China) and navies that constitute the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Thus, SHADE offers options for the Indian Navy (IN) to enhance its cooperation with the US Navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), European Union Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR), and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), all of whom share similar concerns in terms of protecting the International Shipping Lanes off Somalia and the north-east coast of Africa.

Despite its ecologically fragile character and degrading biodiversity, the primary factor that provides Lakshadweep military significance is its potential in terms of safeguarding India’s western seaboard. Its geographic proximity to IOR littoral states such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka further enhances its criticality.

The UTL has attained even greater significance in the wake of the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, which revealed the easy accessibility and consequent vulnerability of India’s west coast to terrorist organizations possessing even a modicum of maritime capacity and capability. There have been unconfirmed reports that malevolent non-State sponsored actors such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) planned to utilize one or more islands of the Lakshadweep group as a base from which they could launch attacks on mainland India. This could well have been based upon an appreciation by the LeT that Lakshadweep, with its predominant Muslim demographic composition (belonging to the Shafi school of thought), offered easy pickings.

The increase of radical Islamic activities in the Indian state of Kerala, which shares linguistic, cultural, and religious affiliations with Indian citizens residing in the Lakshadweep group, has raised security concerns over the possibility of this religious radicalization proliferating to the islands. The apparent vulnerability of the Maldives, as seen from the rise of radical Islam in that country, coupled with the inclusion of Kerala in the revised “Red Corridor” that maps the wide swathe of Naxal influence, is a further cause of concern. Until recently, inadequacies in terms of connectivity of the islands with the Indian mainland also contributed to the islanders’ feeling of isolation from the Indian polity, and their susceptibility to focused influence from other quarters.

Fortunately, the provision of telecommunication facilities has reduced, if not eliminated, this ‘insulation’ of the islands. The downside of this is that the likelihood of ‘online radicalization’ has increased. Somali piracy is another threat that has, in the past, manifested itself in the vicinity of the islands. This has necessitated an intensification of the security of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), which, amongst other measures, includes the setting up of a sophisticated system of coastal security and surveillance focused upon the Eight Degree Channel. This Channel, which separates Minicoy Island from the Maldives, witnesses the daily passage of considerable seaborne traffic. In 2012, the IN operationalized a naval base — INS Dweeprakshak — on Kavaratti Island. In addition, three naval detachments (NAVDETs) are also functioning, one each in the islands of Minicoy, Kavaratti, and Androth.

On another level, the rising presence of extra-regional powers, particularly China, creates a need for greater vigilance and maritime surveillance off the country’s western coast. Beijing’s galloping interests in the IOR, which are evident from its increasing naval presence, as also from the recent establishment of China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, lends additional urgency to the need for a reconfiguration in India’s military approach to Kavaratti.

The geographic position of this island offers the navy better outreach in terms of naval patrolling and surveillance across the Western Indian Ocean. As such, it can be used to great advantage to enhance the IN’s power-projection capabilities. The island territory, as a whole, periodically witnesses a variety of security drills. Exemplifying this is the coastal security exercise, ‘SAGAR KAVACH’, whose latest edition was conducted over three days off the coasts of Lakshadweep, Kerala, and Mahé, from 24 to 26 April 2018. It focused upon reviewing and enhancing the operational readiness of the various stakeholders involved, so as to better tackle seaborne threats. The UTL also hosts other coastal security exercises, such as Exercise GEMINI and the half-yearly NEPTUNE series, which focus on the recalibration of the entire coastal security mechanism. Furthermore, the Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) launched in 2005 by the GoI incorporates the Lakshadweep Islands within its scope. The CSS seeks to enhance the prowess of the Marine Police force, through infrastructure development and capacity building and capability enhancement. The nature of the region also throws up the possibility of community involvement as being the best line of defence against maritime-security challenges.

One such option that seems feasible is to replicate the model obtaining in the state of Kerala, by establishing “Kadalora Jagratha Samithis” (Coastal Awareness Committees) in the Lakshadweep Islands, as a defensive mechanism based upon community participation in matters such as the reporting of unidentified boats, maritime crimes, or any other threat to coastal security.

There is a good chance that the Lakshadweep Islands will be adversely impacted by the devastating effects of climate change and its geographic repercussions. Considering the rising seawater level, the island might even be history, in the long run. Hence, when viewed over a larger timespan, it might even be argued that the ongoing militarization of the region is a vain endeavour.

This notwithstanding, as long as the IOR as a whole remains unaffected, the geopolitical changes in this maritime space call for more investment in terms of ‘military capital’ in the islands, so as to ensure that India prospers within a stable security calculus. There is no doubting the fact that in a geopolitically unpredictable IOR, the Lakshadweep group of islands is a geostrategic asset for India.

The archipelago consists of 12 atolls, three reefs, and five submerged banks. There are 36 islands, covering an area of 32 sq. km., which are geographically isolated and segregated from the mainland (08° 00' N and 12° 30' N lat. and 71° 00' E and 74° 00'E long), about 200-400 km from the Malabar Coast, the coral formations rising from depths ranging from 1500-4000m. The islands scarcely rise 2m above the surface of the water. Except Androth, which is the biggest island, all the islands have a lagoon. Bitra is the smallest island with a large and magnificent lagoon.

Among the uninhabited islands, Suheli is a coconut-growing and fishing centre. Pitti or the bird island is a small reef with a sandbank visited by thousands of birds for nesting, and is designated a bird sanctuary. The islands range in area from one ha. to nearly 440 ha. The oceanic islands have a continental shelf of about 4336 sq. km, a lagoon area of about 4200 sq. km, a territorial area of 20,000 sq. km, and an EEZ of 4,00,000 sq. km accounting for 20% of the Indian EEZ. Lakshadweep is one of the world's most spectacular tropical island ecosystems.

The marine ecosystem is extremely diverse, attributed to geomorphologic and climatic variations along the coast. The precious heritage of ecology and culture is supported by the extremely fragile ecosystems. The major components are the coral reefs, lagoons, seagrasses, seaweeds, algae, and mangroves. These delicate ecosystems are inhabited by a wide variety of fishes, tunas, live-bait, octopus, crabs, molluscs, sponges, echinoderms, other invertebrates, reptiles, dolphins, and whales. From the terrestrial side, the coconut plantations, rodents, and birds play their roles.

The total fish production in the year 2009-10 (CMFRI Annual Report) in Lakshadweep was 10,189 tonnes of which tunas accounted for 8,254t and other fishes 1,925t, whereas the total potential yield was estimated to be 1,00,000t (tunas and other fishes 50,000 t) according to the document on the integrated perspective plan for fisheries development of Lakshadweep (CMFRI, CIFT, lCAR, and Department of Fisheries Lakshadweep).

The document also indicated average annual fish landing to be 11,000 t of which tunas formed an average of 6000 t (1995-2004). About 50% of the total tuna landing is for masmain production, a boiled, smoked, and sun-dried product. The rest is consumed fresh.

In view of the vast marine resources of the region, the Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute (CMFRI) Cochin established a centre for research at Minicoy Island in 1958. Jones and Kumaran (1980) published a monumental treatise on fishes in the Laccadive archipelago. The marine fisheries research conducted in the Archipelago up to 1986 was briefly reviewed in a series of articles incorporated in a special issue on Lakshadweep (Anon, 1986). Fisheries and marine biological features and the pole and line tuna fishery in Lakshadweep were described by James, et.al. (1987 a and b).

The history of marine research in Lakshadweep was reviewed by James (1989). The CMFRI carried out a comprehensive survey of the fishery potential of the islands from January to March 1987 and published the results in a bulletin (Anon, 1989). In the following years and till date, the institute and several other institutions, organizations, and individuals have contributed significantly to the scientific knowledge of terrestrial and aquatic resources and development of the islands.

Coastal erosion is one of the serious natural problems being faced by Lakshadweep. About 200 running km of seashore is stated to be subjected to severe erosion according to the Centre for Earth Sciences Studies (CESS), Thiruvananthapuram. The Space Application Centre (SAC) mapped coral reefs and atolls of the entire Union Territory. Lakshadweep is influenced by southwest monsoon winds.

During the southwest monsoon, the maximum height of waves is 5m and in non-monsoon time 1.4 m (CESS study). Data from the India Meteorology Department indicate mean wind speeds in Lakshadweep in May-Sept. ranges between 6.10-9.25 knots in Minicoy and 7.35-12.54 knots in Amini. Average annual rainfall is about 1640 mm (Minicoy) and 1504 mm (Amini).

Being oceanic, small, and far removed from the mainland; geographically isolated and exposed, the environment could be cruel to the islands at times.

Since they are surrounded by the vast open ocean, they are subjected directly to storms, cyclones, and heavy rains. Their low level makes them vulnerable to sea level rise (even by about two meters and the consequent impact) as an effect of potential global warming and climate change. The islands also face the risk of inundation by sea water due to storm surges as well as tsunami waves. Kalpeni and Androth were devastated, several people died, and coconut trees were destroyed during the great cyclonic storm of April 1847 (Mannadiar, 1997). According to a national task force appointed by the Government of India in 2005 for a special study of Lakshadweep to assess vulnerability to various hazards and suggest mitigation/prevention measures.

In 1891 a violent storm struck Kavaratti, Agatti, and its attached islets and the Amindivi group of islands. Other major storms were recorded in 1922 (Kalpeni), 1941 (Kavaratti), 1963 and 1965 (Androth), and 1977 (Kalpeni). The cyclone from 5-7 May 2004 affected Kavaratti, Amini, Kiltan, Agatti, and Kadamat. Low-lying areas of some of these islands were inundated. On the east coast, breaches 10-30m in width and 1-1.5m in depth were reported.

They also impacted the physical and social infrastructure and became a setback to the pace of development of the islands. It was stated, within 115 years, 27 storms and depressions affected Lakshadweep during the Apr-Dec. period. The tsunami of 2004, which affected several countries across the globe, had also caused minor impacts in Minicoy and Androth indicating the vulnerability of Lakshadweep also to such phenomena.

Within its EEZ, a coastal state has sovereign rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing natural living and non-living resources of the waters superjacent to the seabed and its subsoil. Further, it can exploit and explore the production of energy from water, winds, and currents. The EEZ remains an open zone with freedom of innocent passage for all. The EEZ legal regime is different from that governing territorial waters and high seas, and contains certain characteristics of both.

However, in a recent judgment regarding the Enrica Lexie (Italian marines) case, the Supreme Court of India has declared the region between the contiguous zone and the 200 nautical miles into the sea as ‘High Seas’. The Supreme court has said that Article 97 of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is not applicable as the shooting was a criminal action and not a navigation accident.

China has been maintaining its right to regulate foreign military activities in its EEZ, as it feels that it has the right to prevent any activity that threatens its economic interests or security. It also asserts that its domestic laws have jurisdiction in its EEZ. The Chinese law requires foreign entities to obtain prior approval to carry out resource exploitation, fishing, and marine research. As far as military activities are concerned, it holds them as prejudicial to the ‘peaceful purposes’ provision of the Laws of the Seas Convention.

This interpretation has led to several minor standoffs between it and the United States of America. India is also one of the countries, which mandate prior permission before any maintenance, or repairs are carried out to the submarine cables running on the floor of its EEZ.

With respect to military activities by foreign militaries in the EEZ, India along with Bangladesh, Brazil, Cape Verde, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Uruguay require obtaining prior permission. North Korea has prohibited any such activity within 50 nm of its territory and Iran has completely prohibited the same. As far as oceanographic surveying is considered, again some countries require prior permission, in fact, China registered protests against the activities of USNS Bowditch and India against HMS Scott and USNS Bowditch, which were gathering military data by undertaking oceanographic survey. Coupling the above with increased proliferation of submarines in the region, the instances of clandestine underwater and ASW surveys would only increase.

There are bound to be incidents involving intruder submarines in the future and states would therefore be monitoring activities in their EEZs diligently.

Two essential components of effective EEZ security management comprise surveillance and deterrence. Some of the drawbacks of EEZ surveillance systems in use today include; the inability of patrol boats to carry out surveillance, since their missions are area denial, SAR, or interdiction; UAVs have much better sensor packages but need a large infrastructure for 24/7 surveillance; HF radars are affordable but need very large areas for installation; Microwave radars suffer from limited horizon; and patrol aircraft incur huge costs.

Since radars have difficulty in automatically identifying unknown and devious small vessels and the electro-optic systems are heavily weather dependent, there is a requirement for add-on sensors to carry out effective monitoring of EEZ. In fact, a complete EEZ surveillance system should be able to cater to all the facets of EEZ activity be it terrorism, drug and human trafficking, piracy, smuggling, coastal security, Search and rescue, sea traffic control, pollution control, illegal fishing, illegal arms supply, and exploitation of natural resources of solar, air, wave, minerals, oil, and gas. For such an extensive requirement a cooperative, synergetic system of systems approach between various agencies involved would be paramount.

Prominent Gaps in Coastal and Offshore Defence

The existing gap in Indian defences can be obviated with very potent defence elements by including:

Comprehensive assessment of threats from expeditionary forces to ports/harbours.
Procurement of midget/miniature submarines with torpedoes and mine-laying capability along with arrays of underwater sensors for environment, intrusion information, navigation, and communication.
Procurement of UAVs/USVs with intelligent software for remote operations as swarms.
Procurement of Unmanned Underwater Sensor and Weapon Carriers capable of transmitting integrated underwater pictures to fixed or mobile stations, firing torpedoes, and laying mines.
Procurement and laying of cable-controlled minefields, and other minefields across various depth zones.
Coastal extended reach anti-ship cruise missile batteries.
Coastal gun batteries with the ability to carry out precision attacks on surface ships at ranges greater than 50 km.
All systems networked for ironclad protection of the Indian Coast and offshore assets and territories.
Development of weapons specific for use in coastal areas and
Development of systems for the collection of oceanographic information.

The defence plan should be an asymmetric and proactive approach to defence with defining it as a zone that comprises two segments of the defence environment:

Seaward: The area from the shore to the open ocean, which must be defended to thwart expeditionary forces at sea.
Landward: From the shore to the area inland that can be supported and defended directly from the shore.
From the Sea: From the sea by warships and submarines in case, an incursion has already been made on an unprotected/ inadequately protected island. As well as drawing from offensive infrastructure at the islands in the vicinity.

The surveillance platforms would include the following:

Unmanned undersea vehicles, sonar arrays, patrol submarines, and other underwater sensors.
Remotely operated vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles, offshore platforms, sensors for activity monitoring, and patrol boats.
Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS), communication networks, control centres, pollution monitoring centres, surface and navigation radars, and electro-optic systems.
Unmanned Ariel Vehicles, patrol aircraft, helicopters, aerostats, and sensors.
Observation and communication satellites.

Coming to the deterrence capability in the EEZ, it has to be a non-military option during peacetime, which brings the discussion to the deployment of Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) and the need to develop them for the EEZ environment. Conflicts in the EEZ are definitely going to be unconventional and it would be difficult to distinguish the adversary from the neutrals or friendly vessels.

This may lead to conflicts where the use of lethal weapons may not be permissible. Non-lethal weapons would provide tactical as well as strategic benefits to the EEZ protection force in the global commons. NLW would enable options for de-escalation of conflicts, avoid irretrievable consequences of using lethal options, and result in deterring activity without loss of lives and damage to material.

NLWs have to be cost-effective and easy to operate, as different varieties in varying numbers would be required. However, to ensure a calibrated approach, across the spectrum of conflict, there is also a need for NLWs to be doctrinally integrated with the regular naval forces to enable them to tackle a developing situation in the EEZ.

The following measures are recommended to safeguard the security of these islands:

Combat Efficiency of ANC

India needs to exploit the full military potential of these islands by taking the following actions:

Positioning a fleet of naval warships with Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) in the ANC by 2020.
Ship-based nuclear arsenal and missile defence system needs to be placed at these islands for deterrence.
A joint brigade-sized force, with amphibious capability and Special Forces, needs to be permanently stationed on INS Dweeprakshak in the Lakshadweep Islands.
These island territories need to be included in the ‘Inner Ring’ of the maritime security perimeter of India.

The overall increase in the allocation of resources to facilitate faster development and exposure of the population of these islands to the mainland would deter the non-state actors’ influence. Major infrastructural developments may get hindered by the constantly shifting continental shelves of the A&N Islands, but alternative measures need to be initiated by the Government.

Maritime Surveillance Grid

India needs to develop a strong surveillance grid in and around these island territories to preserve the security and stability of this region. The satellite launched in 2012, which was dedicated to maritime surveillance by the Indian Navy, is an additional asset to this grid. It would be in India’s interest to press for a maritime intelligence-sharing agreement in this region, especially in the Arabian Sea.

These measures would cover the gap; meanwhile, India’s satellite-based surveillance system would attain the capability to cover the entire region in real-time.

Indian Maritime Diplomacy

Diplomatic initiatives with neighbouring countries around these islands would act as a strategic deterrence for extra-regional powers. It would create a perception in the minds of adversaries that the initiation of conflicts at any level in the region would be unacceptable.

Strategic Location Near the SLOC

Lakshadweep is on the trade route between Africa, Arabia, and the west coast of India (Malabar). There has been a drastic increase in passenger and cargo traffic across the seas when untreated wastes and waste oil are discharged from oil tankers and ships into the sea.

These cause heavy pollution, resulting in damage to the coral reefs. Toxic ocean pollutants, marine garbage, and non-point pollutants like runoff from land also add to environmental damage. According to a study by the National Geophysical Research Institute (NGRI), Hyderabad, around a 25% decrease in the growth rate (calcification rate) of hard corals (Porites sp.) was observed between 1993 and 2003 attributed to global warming caused by high levels of carbon dioxide.

Minicoy

Minicoy is the southernmost island in Lakshadweep. It lies between 8° 15’ to 8° 20’ N and 73° 01’ to 73° 05 E with an area of 4.4 sq km including the Viringli islet. Minicoy is separated from the rest of Lakshadweep by the nine-degree channel and from the Maldives by the 8° channel. It is an independent oceanic island that does not belong to either the Maldives or the Lakshadweep bank.

Suheli Par

It is located at 10°05′N 72°17′E / 10.083°N 72.283°E / 10.083; 72.283, 52 km to the SW of Kavaratti, 76 km to the south of Agatti, 139 km to the west of Kalpeni and 205 km to the NNW of Minicoy, with the broad Nine Degree Channel between them. There are two uninhabited islands, Valiyakara at the northern end with a lighthouse ARLHS LAK-015, and Cheriyakara on the southeastern side. These two islands have a long sandbank Suheli Pitti between them.

Minicoy and Suheli Par would synergistically straddle the 9-degree channel, one of the most important SLOC not only for India but also for the Indo-Pacific region and China.

The security of the SLOC would be ensured proactively by developing the defence structure at both islands.

Minicoy is inhabited and Suheli Par is not, thus providing two distinct classes of islands.
Minicoy is geologically different from other islands in the Lakshadweep.
Both have large lagoons.
Both need to be developed for the prosperity and connectivity of the region with the mainland.
Both have poor connectivity with the mainland.
Both can provide security structures for EEZ and its regulation.

The main features of the NAVHQ structures include:

Airstrips for use by tourists as well as defence.
Small harbour facilities.
Submarine piers.
Mini/midget pens.
Staging facilities.
Coastal gun and missile batteries.
Mooring Buoys.
Offshore ammunition storage.
Air defence capability.
Radar and underwater sensors.
Strategic Oil Storage Facility.
Command, Communications, and Control Center for the Indian Navy.
Strategic Communication facility.
Storm Warning and Fisheries information center.
Ocean Surveillance stations and cabled Oceanic Information Observatories.
Floating sun power panels.
Offshore Desalination plants.
Facilities for Tourists.
Linkages with MDA, ODA, and OICZ.

It is important that any academic exercise for the development of a proactive defence infrastructure of island territories considers concepts of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Oceanic Domain Awareness (ODA), and Ocean Information Consciousness Zones (OICZ). MDA focuses upon the maritime security environment specific to naval operations; the ODA focuses upon the overarching oceanic environment. Both are technology-intensive and require sophisticated sensors and computational capabilities. MDA has tactical, regional, and strategic components whereas the ODA is a strategic knowledge-based architecture. Both require elaborate data and information fusing interface with myriad interconnected agencies.

The MDA primarily needs vast inputs from commercial, intelligence, and security agencies and the ODA from advanced research, academic, and scientific communities. The ODA is conceptualized as a comprehensive 3D+ knowledge zone up to India’s EEZ, the OICZ on the other hand is a collaborative approach at sharing oceanic information, processing it as required, and archiving it for use at a later date.

ODA can be established by a country individually, but OICZ requires the transfer/sharing of scientific knowledge and technology between nations. Benefits of ODA accrue to the nation whereas OICZ would empower the region. Both are strategic in nature.

The usage of "geo-spatial tools" behind the "Conceptual Proactive Defense Infrastructure Plan" for Minicoy and Suheli Par

In the field of geopolitical studies, spatial analysis driven by various geographic information system (GIS) technologies helps strategic experts in computing required and desired solutions. In this analysis of Minicoy Island and Suheli Par, Google My Map API is used to perform a variety of geo-spatial calculations by using a set of easy-to-use function calls in the data step. In layman’s terms, a layer-by-layer computational analysis of geographic patterns to find optimum routes, site selection, and advanced predictive modeling to substantiate this analysis has been carried out.

These concepts are formulated by considering the land reclamation factors and available details of the Integrated Island Management Plan of the Government of India (GoI) for Lakshadweep Islands. However, there are certain limitations associated with this analysis with respect to bathymetric data, which has not been considered for evaluation purposes due to the lack of availability of such data in the open/public domain.

Further, these interactive custom maps can be easily exported into KMZ format and can also be embedded seamlessly with other websites for further distribution.

India’s EEZ and island territories face threats of disruption of energy supplies, piracy, and acts of terrorism, in addition to the fact that other nations are keen to poach into the fisheries and seabed wealth. The security of the EEZ and island territories is therefore a matter of India’s national interest and there is a need for boosting the surveillance and augmenting the security arrangements of EEZ’s and island territories.

Even though an ambitious plan for coastal security and maritime domain awareness has been put in place, it needs to be further strengthened and stitched together so that the security of EEZ and Island territories functions as a comprehensive entity with synergies across the various agencies involved.

Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean has become a region of critical importance to several regional and international powers. Within this context, India has undertaken actions aimed at strengthening its strategic foothold in the region, through military partnerships, port development, and intelligence-sharing agreements. While regional organizations like the Indian Ocean Rim Association have been mired in problems of geopolitical disputes and regional alliances, the initiation of such developments by India will ensure increased Indian stake in its own neighbourhood, at a time when countries like China have sought to make significant inroads as well.

Therefore, along with developments at Lakshadweep and the ANC, India’s Indian Ocean strategy is seemingly built on the need to consolidate relationships with numerous stakeholders, so as to displace the strategic ambitions of others in the region. Increased cooperation with the US, France, Australia, Oman, Mauritius, and Seychelles is already underway and could develop into ensuring a strong counter against Chinese influence.

India with its strong maritime capability has attempted to play a key role in establishing stability and peace in the region. The lOR has become ripe for geostrategic rivalry due to mutual distrust between the rim countries which have prevented the creation of an overall security architecture in the region – despite identical priorities and converging interest in maritime affairs. India, therefore, needs to develop binding relations with rim countries.

Multilateral forums like the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (ARC), formed in March 1997, are presently considered moribund. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), formed in 2008, has still not achieved the ultimate aim. Both, South and South East Asian countries, formed the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral, Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) to improve regional, bilateral-level engagement along with subregional initiatives for revitalising joint ventures. India is the flag bearer in various sectors of BIMSTEC.

India is pursuing a multi-pronged strategy that seeks to neutralize other powers in this region. Simultaneously, India is also attempting to strengthen her bilateral relations by improving economic and politico-military relations with countries like Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar. The Government of India has initiated a diplomatic process in various forms with Bangladesh, along with South East Asian nations. Moving further westward, India has also been strengthening its economic, security, and diplomatic relationships with Iran and Arabian countries, with tacit agreement for forming up various task forces to safeguard the region from piracy threat.

The ongoing strategic ethos of India is to collaborate with other important nations like Australia, South Africa, and Indonesia in the lOR for greater development of the region.

The current government in India seems to have prioritized the Indian Ocean, more so than its predecessors. At the beginning of his first term in 2015, Prime Minister Modi visited three important countries within the region, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and the Seychelles. The next year, he visited South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Kenya, four other countries bordering the Indian Ocean. India’s frontal nodes of defense spring from cooperation and in this regard, India has sought to go further in building on its aspirations of becoming the net security provider in the region.

On the one hand, it has played host to a number of joint cooperation exercises such as the Malabar or Milan naval exercises, while on the other, it has initiated logistics exchange agreements with countries like the United States and France, and also conducted coordinated maritime surveillance activities with these countries. India has also sought to consolidate its relations with other states bordering as well as situated within the Indian Ocean Region. In this regard, India has focused on strengthening its ties with countries across the Indian Ocean, developing its first deep-sea port at Sabang in Indonesia, and also working with Oman in developing its port at Duqm.

With Indonesia, relations may soon be upgraded to a strategic partnership and with Oman, India will secure military access to its port at Duqm upon completion. Additionally, in increasing its reach across the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy’s P8I surveillance planes have conducted anti-piracy patrol sorties in the Gulf of Aden and other areas as well. This is symbolic of India’s need to secure its strategic influence and access across the IOR, from the Middle East to Southeast Asia.

More importantly, the Indian government has sought to strengthen ties in its immediate maritime neighbourhood, with Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Mauritius, and the Maldives. In doing so, it has sought to establish security partnerships as well as made smaller military exchanges. For instance, in February 2018, India dispatched its aircraft carrier the INS Vikramaditya, its guided-missile destroyer, INS Mysore, and tanker, INS Deepak to the Maldives. Not only were professional and defence interactions held during the time India also presented a gift to the island nation in the following year.

This gift came in the form of a Made-in-India patrol vessel, which has enhanced bilateral cooperation further. The Indian navy has gifted a similar vessel to the Seychelles and also carried out a few naval exercises as part of project ‘Sambandh’ with the island state. While plans for the establishment of a military base in Seychelles haven’t shown much progress, such actions undertaken by the Indian government are indicative of its aspirations for dominance in the Indian Ocean Region.

India’s aspirations for the Indian Ocean have resulted in it adopting maritime strategies aimed at achieving two distinctive goals. The first is that of a strong forward defence and the second is that of deterrence in the Indian Ocean. Upgradations to its naval capabilities and bases along its maritime frontier are conducive to these goals. During an era of increased competition and uncertainty across the Indo-Pacific, India seemingly has no other option but to increase its strategic influence in the Indian Ocean region. It has become increasingly evident that China has also sought to increase its own influence in the region, making inroads in other states surrounding the IOR. Chinese-directed infrastructural projects in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and other countries have come to be seen as a “string of pearls” strategy, which could be highly compromising for India.

India’s activities in the region are thus products of a certain fear of encirclement by China, currently its biggest competitor in Asia. In this regard, not only has the government begun to develop its frontal nodes of defense but also its naval capabilities.

Extraction of Methane Hydrates from Sea Beds

Massive global reserves of natural gas hydrates play a huge role in the carbon cycle and could be a bridge-fuel to renewable energy sources. Now a new generation of sophisticated models is offering new insights into how they are deposited in nature. Natural gas hydrates are an ice-like solid composed of water and gas, most commonly methane. They only form at high pressure and low temperatures, in places where both water and gas are plentiful. Small changes in temperature and pressure can cause gas hydrates to abruptly separate into water and gas, which means they are very difficult to study. Such conditions are surprisingly common in nature; for example, within sediment layers along the world’s continental margins, and within and beneath Arctic permafrost.

The most interesting fact is that gas hydrate deposits are those found within the pores of coarse-grained, sandy sediments or squeezed into rock fractures. These deposits have the highest concentrations of gas hydrates and are of particular interest because of their energy potential.

Natural gas hydrates, which are derived from naturally occurring gas hydrocarbons, are an important part of the carbon cycle. Estimates vary, but they are thought to hold between 5 and 22 percent (approximately 500 to 2,500 Gigatons) of the Earth’s total organic carbon. Methane itself is a powerful greenhouse gas, with a warming effect nearly forty times that of carbon dioxide. Methane escaping from large natural gas hydrate deposits has been linked to periods of past climate change. Methane hydrate is energy-dense: at atmospheric pressure, each unit of frozen methane hydrate can produce 164 units of natural gas. Their abundance in nature means that methane hydrates represent one of the largest known unconventional energy sources – and a much cleaner alternative to crude oil or coal.

Natural gas hydrate deposits can be categorized into several types depending on where they are found, how they form, and their physical properties. Low concentrations are found almost ubiquitously throughout the first few hundred meters beneath the seafloor around continental margins. If you were to dig into these muddy sediments you would find tiny pockets of methane hydrates in the microscopic pores between sediment grains or within thin, vein-like fractures in the rock. Large fractures connecting the deep subsurface with the seafloor can also be rich in gas hydrates.

At vent sites on the seafloor, methane gas escapes these fractures and seeps into the ocean, typically as a visible stream of bubbles. Extraordinary concentrations (greater than 90 percent of the pore space) are found in coarse-grained, sandy sediments.

We know that most natural gas found in methane hydrates is produced by microorganisms consuming organic matter. Scientists have long known that microorganisms living in the shallow, muddy subsurface produce methane, but this can account for only very low hydrate concentrations.

Methane hydrate can be created in the lab to study the material’s peculiar characteristics. This sample was created with a test tube containing water and methane gas chilled to 42 Fahrenheit (6 Celsius) and pressurized to 1,500 psi – that’s over a hundred times atmospheric pressure! The exception lies within thin layers of coarse-grained sand, where, over time, hydrates collect through simple diffusion. Lab experiments have shown hydrates migrating into centimeter-thick sand layers, leaving little or no hydrates in the surrounding muds. This matches well with observations of this kind of deposit. We also expect to find moderately high concentrations deeper in the Earth. As sediments sink, the icy hydrates they carry melt, releasing their gas. This gas bubbles back up to form more gas hydrates just above the boundary, where they melt.

The most exciting advances have come from recent models showing how methane flows as a free gas – rather than dissolved in water – through the deep subsurface. Free gas flow allows the low concentration methane produced by microbial biogenesis to be concentrated into high concentration deposits. These models have changed our thinking about how highly concentrated deposits form and so far, are supported by evidence from the field. The methane in most natural hydrates comes from microbial biogenesis as microorganisms consume organic carbon found in sediments. However, our understanding of this process is still evolving.

Biogenic gas is already showing potential as a critical energy source. Leviathan, a massive biogenic gas field off the coast of Israel, contains enough natural gas to power Israel for hundreds of years. When it began commercial production last year it completely transformed Israel’s energy security.

Another big question is how methane finds its way into hydrate deposits. We now know that flowing bubbles of methane play an important role in this process. The next challenge is to understand how the bubbles move through different types of sediments near the seafloor, and how hydrate formation affects the flow of gas. Finally, an exciting and complicated question is how deposits with mixed gas hydrates form and dissociate.

Models and observations tell us that layers of ethane hydrate can be found beneath pure methane hydrate deposits. We are only just beginning to explore why and how this fractionation occurs. The same process could allow us to ‘swap’ methane with carbon dioxide in hydrate deposits, raising the exciting prospect of simultaneous energy production and carbon storage for a nearly carbon-neutral system. By answering these questions, we will be deciphering an important part of our world’s carbon cycle with implications for societal issues that span climate change, geo-hazards, and energy security.

Geo-Strategic Importance

Lakshadweep and A&N Islands are strategically important due to the following reasons:

They can be used as a launch pad during symmetric and asymmetric conflicts.
A&N Islands are the ‘entry’ and ‘exit’ points to the Pacific Ocean from the Indian Ocean. Lakshadweep Islands can be used as a vantage point to monitor any movement of vessels in the Arabian Sea.
They provide a large area of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with reserves of natural resources which will boost the economy of India.
These Islands would play a key role in controlling the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) during conflicts/crises due to their close proximity to the following choke points: The Six Degree Channel: The primary passage from the A&N Islands to the Strait of Malacca is through the Six Degree Channel — stretching from Indira Point on Great Nicobar Island to the modern tip of Aceh on the Indonesian Island of Sumatra. The Nine Degree Channel: The Nine Degree Channel, located near Lakshadweep islands, is the most direct route for ships sailing from the Persian Gulf bound for East Asia. Strait of Malacca: Strait of Malacca links the Indian and Pacific Oceans and is located close to A&N Islands. It is one of the critical choke points. Its closure may lead to an imbalance in the world economy.

A&N and Lakshadweep Islands and adjacent areas are rich in natural resources, have reserves in Oil and Natural Gas, and are also a great source of marine life. Oil and Gas have been discovered in the seabed on the Burmese side, but similar discoveries are yet to be made on the Indian side. Since 2009, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited has been exploring these Islands under a new Exploration Licensing Policy. These Islands are the supporting pillars of the growing Indian economy and can prove to be a gold mine for India.

India’s expanding economy and concurrent share of maritime trade underline the need of safeguarding SLOCs and carrying out anti-piracy operations (ops) in the lOR. The islands enable India to play a key role in safeguarding chokepoints and SLOCs. The presence of Armed Forces in these Islands deters pirate attacks in the Indian maritime domain. Joint exercises with foreign navies are being conducted from these islands to improve the security of maritime assets of India.

The Look East Policy was initiated by the Indian Government in the 1990s to exploit the growing markets of the Asia-Pacific region. As part of the Look East Policy, India is expanding and reinforcing its earlier initiatives in building defence and economic ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Its proximity to Southeast Asia makes India as much part of that region as that of Asia. Presently, the only communication line to the Southeast nations is via the sea route – until the proposed road network project through Myanmar becomes operational. These Islands would play a pivotal role in increasing the transport network ‘to and fro’ from East Asia and acting as a projection point for India in furtherance of its Look East Policy. The presence of the Indian security forces in these islands enhances the stability and security of this region. It is an additional stake for pursuing Look East Policy.

The demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and shrinking of Europe’s geopolitical significance have diverted everyone’s attention to lOR. As appreciated by Admiral AT Mahan in the 19th century, this region has emerged as the centre of future power dynamics, conflicts, and military and trade activity in the 21st Century. All major powers are striving to mark their presence in the lOR. Extra-regional powers like the United States of America, Europe, Israel, and West Asian countries are taking measures to link up with this region. Important inter/intra-regional states playing a key role in this region with their interests are enumerated below:

The United States of America (US)

The US is a key external actor in the lOR. It has a more significant military presence in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Pakistan, East and Northeast Africa, Singapore, and Diego Garcia. The US concern in this region is international terrorism, religious extremism, energy security, and also the expansion of Chinese influence in this region. Presently, the US has established a major military base in Diego Garcia. It is also developing a “Unified Command” plan in the Indian Ocean. The prime importance for the US now is to protect the SLOCs through the Strait of Malacca. The US has also developed a healthier relationship with India and Indian Ocean littorals. In spite of the denial of membership in IONS in 2008, the US Navy participated in the ‘Malabar’ series of naval exercises with the Indian Navy. The main objective of these exercises is to increase the ‘interoperability’ between the two Navies.

People’s Republic of China (PRC)

PRC is carrying out various activities at the military and diplomatic levels to secure its interests in the IOR. China has established a complex ‘soft power’ web of diplomacy, trade, humanitarian assistance, arms sales, port construction, and even strategic partnerships with many countries in the region. It is setting up a series of ports (String of Pearls) in the lOR. The Chinese government is also envisioning a canal across the Isthmus of Kra, in Thailand, which links the Indian Ocean to China’s Pacific coast. The overstated belief is that the ‘String of Pearls’ would encircle the Indian influence in this region. But the actual purpose of this strategy is to maximize access to resource inputs and trade during peacetime; while raising the political costs of seaborne energy supplies by severing SLOCs in times of crisis.

Pakistan

Pakistan’s coastline in the Indian Ocean is a vital access point for trade and energy supply. Pakistan’s major interest in the lOR is preventing India from dominating the areas closer to Pakistan. Strategic balancers are the more important part of Pakistan’s Indian Ocean strategy. Pakistan is also an active participant in the multilateral anti-piracy task force.

Japan

Japan is very keen to secure the SLOCs since it relies heavily on the free flow of oil supplies from the lOR. In this respect, Japan has initiated diplomatic talks with littorals of the lOR to develop cordial relations. Recently in mid-2012, Japan participated in Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) 12 with the Indian Navy and Coast Guard.

Israel

Israel is also navigating through the turbulent waters of the lOR and showing their presence in this region by establishing a secret logistic naval base on the island of Dhalak, Eritrea, which is close to Bab-e-Mendel in the Red Sea. From this island, no vessel can traverse the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea undetected by Israel. Other countries like Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and South African nations are more inward-looking, but for them, the major significance of the Indian Ocean is economy-related.

Threat to National Security

The prevailing situation in the lOR poses the following challenges to our National Security:

Rivalry for Natural Resources: The continued growth of all nations may create an increasing rivalry for resources, which would force the nations to claim sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean waterways and natural resources. The recession and globalization are other factors which may result in conflict. India’s vast ownership of high seas in this region may lure neighbours/littorals to claim part of it. The isolated island territories would be soft targets in case of conflict in this region.
Religious Fanaticism: These islands are prone to religious fanaticism due to the long distances from the mainland and their lack of exposure to the mainstream population. The local inimical elements are active and willing partners in religious fanaticism. Many sponsoring states provide all-around assistance to the local organizations. Such forces are establishing their operating base in and around these islands like Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, and Thailand.
Terrorism and Nuclear Threat: The epicentre of world terrorism and nuclear proliferation lies in this region. Regional states in the lOR are aiding and abetting subversive elements. In the coming decades, the use of sea routes by terrorist organizations is likely to increase due to the effectiveness of countermeasures on the mainland.
Development: Underdevelopment of these islands and alienation from the mainland would lead the population to get influenced by non-state actors. Presently, adequate resources are not being allocated for development programmes. The youth of these underdeveloped islands may either be coerced or motivated to pose a security threat to the Indian establishment.

Conclusion

Ownership of these islands has been challenged by several regional and extra-regional powers in different periods of India’s post-Independence existence. In 1965, during the Indo-Pak War, Indonesia contested the status of the A&N Islands and claimed them as their territory. Keeping the past history and prevailing condition of littoral states in mind, India needs to play a safe “oceanic chess game in the lOR”. In this game, India needs to reorient her thinking on these islands. These islands are not merely to be defended but India needs to develop these islands as a ‘strategic strongpoint.’ The geographical location of these islands provides a tactical advantage to India during conflicts. If the need arises, these islands can be used as a springboard to project military power directly against the adversaries or to the South China Sea-Pacific Ocean region. Therefore India needs to change the existing frames of references on these islands with the above-discussed facets.

India needs to exploit the geo-strategic advantages of A&N and Lakshadweep Islands to enable her to play a pivotal role in the Asian strategic setting. India can ill afford to ignore the lessons of history and contemporary strategic imperatives because doing so would severely limit the space for political, diplomatic, and military manoeuver in this region. A well-orchestrated use of these islands, to further the Nation’s foreign and strategic policy, is the present requirement of India. Secure and stable island territories would be the staging post for India to start looking at and rediscovering its great maritime and political influence in this region.

In the past, these Islands have been grossly neglected by policymakers, however, after the waterborne 26/11 terrorist attack from Pakistan was a watershed moment of humiliation for the coastal security agency which forced a rethinking of the Oceanic assets, with a nimble-footed approach to maritime surveillance and MDA (maritime domain awareness). However, strategic deterrence and D4 capabilities as discussed above are still lacking. These Islands are treasure houses of resources; the fact the policymakers in Delhi have been neglectful of them in the past shouldn’t give misplaced comfort and complacency that our adversaries are not aware of the fact these Islands are gems and jewels in the IOR. With the advent of the BRI & MSR geopolitical and geo-economic projects from China, the security challenge has only increased. Today IOR is the number one “maritime silk route”. The mastery of this Ocean in the past has made India historically at the apex of the ancient globalised world order which had led to its famed prosperity and the “Golden bird” of Asia. Only within the significant decline in naval prowess following the decline of the Chola empire and the central and southward expansion of the Muslim rules from the invading forces of North of India; and subsequent subjugation of the zamorin kingdoms by the visiting “treasure fleet” from the Ming China, did India lose its eminent position in the globalised world order never to regain it back till the present and was eventually subjugated and colonised by the marauding forces of European imperialists.

These islands are not only critical to the country from the security prism but also very important to the nation in the food security supply chain with vast and untapped fishing capacity, and the energy security from the extraction of oil/natural gas or hydrated methane. It is also important to the global ecology due to the delicate and fragile ecosystem which makes it an ocean paradise, much to the comfort of anyone visiting these Islands. These serene and beautiful Islands are probably the most understated global tropical tourist spots; which if developed and promoted can rival if not overtake the Bahamas and The Caribbean as tourist destinations of virgin natural beauty. Hence, a total revision of the vision and importance given to these Islands have to happen in the corridors of power which should at least be in par with our Chief rival China which it affords to its disputed islands in the first Island Chain.

According to the latest plans set out by the Indian government, the Indian navy aims at comprehensively enhancing its capabilities by increasing its total strength to 200 ships, 500 aircraft, and 24 attack submarines among other equipment by 2027. India now sees the need for strategic defence and deference in the IOR, rather than the restraint it has exercised in the past. While developments at Lakshadweep may not be wholly seen as conducive to the creation of an advanced strategic naval command base, those at the ANC can definitely be viewed as such. Not only has India been upgrading the current infrastructure of the island on its own, but there is also the possibility of collaboration with other countries in this regard. Japan has already been a key investor in many projects being initiated on the islands and contributions by countries like the US and France may also be forthcoming. Andaman and Nicobar already serve India as a crucial geo-strategic command centre in the IOR, however, recent developments are indicative of further cooperation and development.

The ANC may soon become India’s second stage of defence, a base for power projection, maritime security, and a crucial tool in constraining China’s influence. While this will definitely enhance Indian naval capabilities in a number of ways, transforming the Indian navy into a formidable Blue Water force, the Indian defence establishment has had many shortfalls in its procurement processes which need to be addressed if such aspirations are to be achieved. The country has set itself on the course of advancement in both the military as well as the strategic domain, however, a few shortfalls could hinder such progress.

Nonetheless, India’s Indian Ocean strategy has received increased focus over the past few years as is evident in the developments at Andaman and Lakshadweep as well as the cooperation with regional and international powers. The recent border clashes with China have also seemed to quicken the pace of India’s actions and plans for the IOR. If such dynamics are consistently built upon, India could indeed achieve its goal of becoming the net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region and possibly also dominate it.